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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD C. TEAGUE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN 
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, and MILTON 
C. BRANDON, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 8232 
This is an orig)inal proceeding by which Howard 
Teague seeks an Order of this Court under the pro-
visions of Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
permanently prohibiting the defendant District Court 
from proceeding with the case now pending in that 
court, entitled Milton C. Brandon, Plaintiff, vs. Howard 
C. Teagvue, Defendant, Civil No. 99973. A extraordinary 
writ in the nature of an alternative writ of pr~ohibition 
was issued by this Court on July 21, 1954, for the pur-
pose of allowing this Court to inquire into the matter. 
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The ground upon which Teague seeks to have the 
alternative writ made permanent is that the defendant 
District Court has assumed to act "Tithout and in excess 
of its jurisdiction, since Teague was not personally 
served with process, and the only process against him 
was that served upon the Secretary of State under the 
provisions of the statute known as the Non-Resident 
Motorist Act, 41-12-8, U.C.A., 1953. Teague claims he 
was not a "non-resident motorist" within the meaning 
of that Act. 
For the convenience of the Court, and to avoid 
confusion, the parties '"ill be designated by name. 
On October 2, 1953, Brandon, a resident of Everett, 
Washingjton, filed his complaint against Teague in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County. He alleged that 
Teague "is a non-resident of the State of Utah" ( empha-
sis ours). He claimed further that on August 8, 1952 
he was riding in a car being driven by Teague in Salt 
Lake County, and that he sustained injuries in an acci-
dent which resulted from Teague's willful misconduct. 
(R. 3, 4). 
On October 2, 1953, a summons and a copy of the 
complaint 'Were filed with the Secretary of State of 
Utah (R. 11), in an attempt to serve Teague under the 
provisions of Chapter 41-12-8, U.C.A., 1953. The perti-
nent portions of this statute are as follows: 
"The use and operation by a nonresident or 
his agent of a motor vehicle upon and over the 
highways of the state of Utah shall be deemed 
:~: 
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3 
an appointineut by such nonresident of the sec-
retary of state of the state of Utah, to be his 
true and lawful attorney upon whom may be 
served all legal processes in any action or pro-
ceeding against him g1rowing out of such use or 
operation of a motor vehicle over the highways 
of this state resulting in damages or loss to per-
son or property and said use or operation shall be 
a signification of his agreement that any such 
pi"ocess shall, in any action against him which is 
so served, be of the same legal force and validity 
as if served upon him personally . . . '' 
Brandon's counsel, by affidavit dated October 2, 
1953, stated he had mailed, on October 1, 1953, by regis-
tered mail, a copy of the complaint and smnmons to 
Teague at his last known address : '' Deseret Chemical 
Depot, Tooele County, Utah" (R. 6). Included with the 
summons and complaint, according to the affidavit, was 
a notice to defendant of the purported service upon the 
Secretary of State ·(R. 7). 
On .March 25, 1954, Teague, appearing specially, 
moved the Court to quash the service of summons upon 
the ground that he was not subject to service of process 
under the provisions of Section 41-12-8, U. C.A., 1953, since 
he \vas not a "non-resident" at the time of the alleged 
accident. This motion was supported by the affidavit 
of one of counsel for Teague, in which it was stated that 
at the time of the alleged accident, Teague was a member. 
of the Armed Forces of the United States, stationed 
within the borders of the State of Utah, and had been 
so stationed for many months prior to said date and 
wa~ so stationed for 1nany months following the date of 
I, 
:' 
II 
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said accident and until the sununer of 1953, and that 
at all times during that period defendant could be found 
at Deseret Chemical Depot, Tooele County, Utah. (R. 14). 
Brandon filed no counter affidavit. At the hearing 
on the Motion, Brandon's counsel took the stand and testi-
fied, in substance, that he had made "diligent search 
concerning Mr. Teague" and that he was not within 
the state "at this time." This testimony was on April 
20, 1954, more than six rrwnths after the complaint was 
filed and twenty months after the accident. Counsel 
also stated that, at smne date not specified, prior to 
the filing of the complaint in the present matter, suit 
was brought against the United States "in this matter" 
and that Teague was not then within the State of Utah. 
(R. 25 ). 
I.t will be observed that this testimony does not con-
tro¥ert the affidavit filed on behalf of Teague. The 
testimony was directed to the proposition that, at the 
time of the complaint, fourteen months after the acci-
den, Teague was not within the borders of Utah and had 
a mailing address in another state. Exhibit P-1, a copy 
of the State Police report, showed that the car bein~ 
driven by Teague had out-of-state license plates, although 
the address of T-eague was given as Deseret Chemical 
Depot, which is, of course, in Tooele County, Utah. 
Despite the fact that no further showing was made 
on behalf of Brandon, the District Court, on May 13, 
1954, denied Teague's n1otion to quash. 
r 
'l 
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Teague thereupon filed his petition for intermediate 
appeal to the Supreme Court of the Strute of Utah, Case 
No. 8204, which petition was by this Court denied on 
June 1, 1954. Teague thereafter commenced this original 
proceeding by filing his complaint against Brandon and 
the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and 
for Salt Lake Oounty, State of Utah. Upon this com-
plaint an alternative writ was issued by this Court on 
July 21, 1954, and the record of proceedings before the 
District Court was filed in this Court on October 19, 
1954. 
STATEMENT ·oF POINTS 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, IS PROCEEDING WITHOUT AND IN EXCESS OF ITS 
JURISDICTION IN THAT ACTION PENDING BEFORE IT, 
ENTITLED MILTON C. BRANDON, PLAINTIFF VS. 
HOWARD C. TEAGUE, DEFENDANT, CASE NO. 99973, IN 
THAT THE COMPLETE RECORD OF THAT COURT FAILS 
TO SHOW THAT How· ARD C. TEAGUE WAS A NON-RESI-
DENT OF UTAH AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, IS PROCEEDING WITHOUT AND IN EXCESS OF ITS 
JURISDICTION IN THAT ACTION PENDING BEFORE IT, 
ENTITLED MILTON C. BRANDON, PLAINTIFF VS. 
HOWARD C. TEAGUE, DEFENDANT, CASE NO. 99973, IN 
THAT THE COMPLETE RECORD OF THAT COURT FAILS 
TO SHOW THAT HOWARD C. TEAGUE WAS A NON-RESI-
DENT OF UTAH AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. 
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It vvill be obserYed from the lang1uage of the Utah 
statute, quoted in the Statement of Facts, that it is the 
"use and operation" of a n1,otor vehicle by a non-resident 
which is construed as an "appointment by such non-
resident" of the Secretary of State as his attorney on 
'~'hom process may be served. Further, it is such "use 
or operation'' which signifies the '' agree,Inent'' of the 
non-resident tha1t such process shall have legal effect. 
It is our contention that this statutory language is 
susceptible of only one reasonable interpretation, namely, 
that the term ''non-resident'' refers to the time of the 
''use and operation'' of the vehicle, and not to the time 
of the commencement of an action arising out of such 
use and operation. 
Our research discloses that simHar statutes have 
been so construed by both Federal and State courts 
and we have failed to find any case where the court has 
adopted a contrary view. 
The following eases support our position: 
Fisher v. Terrell, et .al., (New Mexico, 1947) 187 P. 
(2d) 387; DeFier, et ux. v. Maddox et .al., (Cal., 1948) 
197 P. (2d) 87; Johnson v. Jacoby, (Ct. of App., Dist. 
of Col., 1952) 195 F. (2d) 563; Wood v. White, 68 App. 
D. C. 341, 97 F. (2d) 646 (1938), Certiorari denied, 304 
U.S. 578; Clendening v. Fitterer, (Okla., 1953) 261 P. 
(2d) 896; Red Top Cab~· Baggage Co. for Use and Bene-
fit of Fountaine v. Iiolt, Judge, (Fla., 1944), 16 Southern 
(2d) 649; N01rthwest JJfortgage and Secu.rity Co. v. Noel 
Constnt.ction Co., (North Dakota, 1941), 300 N.W. 28; 
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Roach v. Raupp, (Iowa, 1940), 289 N.W. 760; Warwick 
Y. District Court of City and County of Denver, et al., 
(Col., 1954), 269 P. (2d) 704; Suit v. Shailer, et al., (D. C., 
D. l\fd., 1937), 18 F. Supp. 568; Colon et·al. v. Penn. Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., et a.Z., (New Jersey, 1953), 99 A. (2d) 
181; Rontpza v. Lucas, et al., (Ill., 1949), 85 N.E. (2d) 
467; Iiinten et al. v. Peter· et al., (Minn., 1952), 55 N.W. 
(2d) 442; Way v. Turner, (Ga., 1950) 57 S.E. (2d) 439. 
The rule has been stated in this language by the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court: 
''The statute does not apply to a motorist who 
was a resident of the state at the time the acci-
dent occurred, although he thereafter leaves the 
state and becomes a non-resident and is a non-
resident at the time suit is brought.'' Clendenvng 
v. Fitterer supra. 
In Carlson v. District Cou'ff of City and County of 
Denver, et al., (Colo., 1947), 180 P. (2d) 525, the court 
had before it this statutory provision: 
''The operati~on by a non-resident of a motor 
vehicle on a public highway in this state shall be 
dee·med equivalent to an appointment by such 
non-resident of the secretary of state to be his 
or its true and lawful attorney, upon whom may 
be served all lawful civil processes in any actions 
... ~owing out of any accident ... in which such 
non-resident may be involved ... " 
It was held that non-residence at the time of the 
accident wa~ required for service of process under that 
statute. 
! I 
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In the case of J(rwrland v. Chernobil, et al., 260 New 
York 254, 183 N.E. 380, the Court of Appeals clearly 
indicated that the controlling faotor is the status of the 
defendant at the ti1ne of the aecident. For many years, 
the traffic laws of New York contained a provision allow-
ing £or ·service of process upon a non-resident motorist in 
language almost identical to the Utah statute. It was 
apparently recognized by the New York Legislature that 
the statute made no provision for serrvice upon a motorist 
who was a resident of New York at the time of the 
accident, but who subsequently, and before suit was filed, 
became a non-resident, for the Legislature added a new 
section to the code specifically covering that situation. 
In the Kurland case, the accident happened before 
the addition to the st~atute became effective. After its 
effective date, the action was instituted against the defend-
ant Lehman. In holding that the time of accident is the 
critical time, :the Court said: 
"When this defendant operated his car on 
our highways, certainly he did not in fact agree 
to vest the Secreta.ry of State with any power of 
agency for the receipt of service of process. At 
that time no presumption had been established, 
for the presumption exists only by reason. of 
statutory enactment, and no statute applicable to 
persons of his class was then· effective.'' 
(Emphasis added) 
In the case of lVood v. White, et al., supra, the United 
States Court of Appeals £or the District of Columbia, 
had before it for decision a question similar to that 
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presentl~, before this Court. The Circuit Court was 
a;;kl'd to adopt an interpretation of the statute so that 
the statute would read in effect: 
''The operation by a non-resident (or by a 
resident who shall have become a non-resident 
at the time process is issued) shall be deemed an 
appointment of a statutory agent for the service 
of process.'' 
The Court, in rejecting this interpretation, stated 
that this view would require the Court to hold that the 
word "non-resident" actually means "resident." The 
Court observed that this ''would go f,ar beyond any 
reasonable process of legislative interpretation." Con-
tinuing, the Court observed that: 
''Where a statute imposes a contractual 
obligation in derogation of the com,mon law, and 
affects substantial rights, it cannot be extended 
by implication to include persons who do not 
come within its terms, but instead must be strictly 
construed.'' 
The Court concluded that: 
"It is the non-resident, and the non-resident 
only, who, by making use of the high ways, signifies 
his agreement that substituted service may he 
made upon him and that he does so only at the 
time he uses the highways and only by the act of 
operating a motor vehicle thereon." 
An examination of decisi,ons reaching a contrary 
result jndicates that in those jurisdictions ~a statute funda-
mentally djfferent from our Section 41-12-8, U.C.A., 1953, 
was before the court. See for example, State ex rel 
I' 
' I 
I 
I! 
j 
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Thompson v. Disbrict Cottrt of the Fourth Judicial Dis-
trict in and for Missoula County, et al., (Mont., 1939), 
91 P. (2d) 422, where the statute provided: 
''The operation by any person . . . of any 
motor vehicle ... on any public way in this state, 
shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by 
such person of the secretary of state ... to ·be 
h.i-s true and lawful attorney upon whom may be 
served all lawful processes in any action . . . 
g\rowing out of an accident ... in which he ... 
may be involved while operating a motor vehicle 
on any public way in this state ... " (Emphasis 
added) 
See also Sanders v. Paddock, (Ill., 1951) 97 N.E. (2d) 
600, decided after amendment to the Illinois statute, 
subsequent to the decision in Rompza v. Lucas, (Ill., 
1948), 85 N.E. (2d) 467. 
\Vhen the Illinois and Montana statutes are closely 
examined it is clear that decisions based upon such 
statutes can have no force in the determination of a 
proper ·interpretation of the Utah statute, since the 
language is fundamentally different. 
\Ye submit that on the basis of the cases hereinabove 
cited and discussed, and on the basis of sound logic and 
reasoning, the only proper conclusion is that a motorist 
cannot be subject to service of process under the Utah 
Non-Resident Motorist Statute, unless he was in fact 
anon-resident at the time of his use of our highways. 
With this rule in mind it becomes pertinent to 
examine the record of the trial court to determine if 
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there was 'a showing that Teague was a non-resident at 
the time of the accident. Teague's special appearance 
for the purpose of quashing the purported service of 
summons upon him, constitut~d a 0hallenge to the juris-
diction of the court and the burden was thus thrust 
upon Brandon to show that the tdal court was properly 
exercising its jurisdiction. 
It is a rule of general application that when juris-
diction is challenged the court's duty to inquire into 
its right to entertain the procedure is imperative, and he 
who invokes the court's power must show that he is 
properly before it. See In re Pacific States Savings cy 
Loan Company (D. C. Cal., 1939), 27 F. Supp. 1009. 
This rule has been recognized and applied in several 
cases involving non-resident motorist statutes in which 
the defendant has attacked the jurisdiction of, the court 
by motion to quash the service of sum·mons. In Carlson v. 
District Court of City and County of Denver, et al., supra, 
the defendant appeared specially and moved the Colorado 
Supreme Court for an order quashing service of summons 
upon him on the ground that he was a resident at the 
time of the accident. The Court said: 
"The motion to quash challenged the court's 
jurisdiction and consequently the burden of proof 
in the District Court was on Fodor (plaintiff 
below) to establish by competent evidence all the 
facts es·sential to the court's jurisdiction. One of 
these essential facts in the instant case was the 
non-residence of plaintiff here (defendant below) 
at the time of the accident on December 4, 1944." 
p. 530. 
I 
i: 
I I 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
A similar rule was adopted in Wanrick v. District 
Court of Ci.ty and Coumty of Denver, (Colo., 1954), 269 
P. (2d) 704, and Romp.za v. Lucas, et al., (Ill., 1949), 85 
N.E. (2d) 467. 
; 
In Jerma.ine v. Graf, et a_l., (Iowa, 1939), 283 N.W. 
428, one of the defendants moved to quash the service 
of summons upon hiin on the ground that he was not a 
''person'' within the meaning of the act. The Court s~aid: '"' 
~I 
"'I'he special appearance was a direct attack. 
The burden rested on plaintiff to sustain by 
adequate showing the questioned jurisdiction ·~ 1 
* * * " 
Plaintiff's pleadingJs in the trial court contain only 
one statement relative to the non-residence of the defena-
ant, Teague. It is alleged in. the complaint that Teague 
"is a non-res~dent" (R. 3) (emphasis ours). This com-
plaint was filed on October 2, 1953. The accident occurred 
on August 8, 1952, according to plaintiff's complaint. 
No statement is made as to defendant's residence at 
that time. That time, however, is the critical time. Resi-
dence or non-re·sidence at the time of the commence-
ment of the action is wholly immaterial. See Carlson v. 
District Cottrt, supra, and Rompza v. Lucas, supra, where 
the Illionis court in affirn1ing an order setting aside 
a judgment said : 
'' ... the affidavit is to the effect that the 
defendants were non-residents eleven months 
after the accident. It does not appear that they 
were non-resjdents. on May 26, 1946 (the date of 
the accident). ' ' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
The pleadings of the plaintiff in the lower court 
affirmatively show that Teague's last address was in 
Tooele County, Utah. It cannot seriously be urged that 
these ple'adings raise even a suggestion of jurisdiction 
over the person of the defendant. 
Teague's motion to quash the service of summons 
and the affidavit attached, state that he was not a non-
resident at the time of the accident, having been stationed 
within the borders of Utah as a member of the Armed 
Forces of the United States for many months prior to 
the date of the accident, August 8, 1952, and thereafter 
until the summer of 1953. On the hearing upon the motion 
the evidence showed that Teague was located within the 
State of Utah until the summer of 1953. Mr. Dwight 
King, attorney for Brandon, testified that Howard C. 
Teague was not a resident of the State of Utah at the 
time the complaint was filed. He ,also offered in evidence 
a purported copy of a motor vehicle accident report. 
Even if this report be considered competent evidence-
which it obviously is not-it added only one additional 
fact. It showed only that the automobile owned and 
driven by Teague carried 'a North Carolina license plate. 
A similar showing as to the license plate was made 
in Carlson v. District Court of City and Cownty of Denver 
et al., supra. The Colorado Supreme Court said: 
''If it should be held here that simply because 
the automobile driven by plaintiff bore an Illinois 
license rather than a Colorado license, we should 
be obliged to hold the licensee to be a non-resi-
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dent, we ·would be adopting .an artificial, strained, 
and unwarranted construction on the term 'non-
resident.' '' p. 530. 
In Johnson v. Jacoby, (Di~t. of Col. Court of 
Appeals, 1952), 195 Fed. (2d) 563, plaintiff brought suit 
to recover dmnages for personal injuries sustained on 
April 24, 1945. The suit was filed on November 18, 1947. 
J a0oby moved to quash the service on the ground that 
he was not a non-resident, having left his home in N·ew 
York to accept employment in the District of Columbia 
and having actually lived in the District of Columbia 
until January, 1946. The affidavit filed in opposition 
to the motion to quash stated that Jacoby's automobile 
bore New York license plates on the ·date of the accident. 
The court said that although Jacoby may have been domi-
ciled inN ew York on April 24, 1945, he ·actually resided in 
the District of Colunrbia from December 31, 1943, until 
January, 1946, and that there was nothing in the case 
to indicate that Jacoby would not hwve been amenable 
to service in the ordinary way at any time within eight 
months after the accident. In affirming the order of the 
lower court quashing the summons, the court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit, said: 
''In our view the statute was not intended to 
reach an actual resident such as Jacoby was, 
but was enacted to provide a ·means of bringing 
before the local court a non-resident transient 
motorist who is here today and gone tomorrow." 
In Suit v. Sha,i.Zer, a Federal Case, supra, the plain-
tiff urged that the automobile being driven by the defend-
ant was registered in California. In holding that this 
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fact did not affect the question of residence, and in grant-
ing the rnotion to quash the service of summons, District 
J udg;e Chesnut of the District Court for the District of 
Maryland, said: 
''The mischief which was intended to be 
overcome by the statute was obviously the diffi-
culty of effecting service of summons in the usual 
way within the state on transient motorists or 
non-residents who are only temporarily within the 
state, 'but no such condition existed in this case 
where the defendant was actually residing within 
the state for two years before the wrong com-
plained of and for more than a year thereafter. 
There is nothing in this case to indicate that 
she would not have been amenable to service of 
summons in the ordinary way at any time within 
a year after. the accident, and indeed it appears 
that she could not in fact have effectively been 
sued elsewhere than in Maryland during that 
period.'' p. 571. 
The basis of jurisdiction in personam over non-resi-
dent motorists under the Utah statute is not operation of 
an automobile bearing an out-of-state license. It is "the 
use and operation" by a non-resident of an automobile 
upon the highways of Utah. Residence of the driver, not 
registration of the automobile is the test. 
In Chapman v~ Daf/Jis, (Minn., 1951), 45 N.W. (2d) 
822, the court said in affirming an order quashing service 
of summons: 
"The mischief which was intended to be 
rmnedied ... was the difficulty of effecting service 
of sumnwns in the usual way within the state on 
j I 
I 
I. 
j 
,, . 
~ 
I
: 
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non-residents who were only temporarily within 
the state. But no such eondition existed in this 
case, where defendant ·was actually residing within ,·Jr 
the state for almost a year after the alleged acci-
dent." p. 827. 
In the instant case it is clear that from the time 
of the accident on August 8, 1952, until the late summer 
of 1953, the defendant below was subject to service of 
process at the Deseret Chemical Depot, Tooele County, 
Utah, under Section 63-8-1, U.C.A., 1953, which provides 
for the service of process upon lands acquired by the ':m 
United States for Military or Naval purposes. And 
under the decision of Booth v. Crockett, District Judge, 
et al., 110 Utah 336; 173 P. (2d) 647 (1946), the def·endant 
below would not hruve been subject to service of process 
at any other place. 
In that case the evidence showed that Frank Fair-
banks went to the U.S. Naval Training Depot at San 
Diego, California on December 5, 1945. A summons was 
left with his mother at the Fairbanks home on December 
13, 1945. The defendant moved to quash the service of 
summons on· the ground that the Fairbanks home was 
not ''the usual place of abode'' of Frank Fairbanks. The 
motion was granted. On appeal, the Supreme Court, 
citing [{ urilla v. Roth, 132 N.J.L. 213; 38 A. (2d) 862 
(1944) said : 
'' 'Abode' is one's fixed place of residence 
for the time being-the place where a person 
dwells. One':-; usual place of 'abode' in the statu-
tory view, is the place where one is 'actually 
Jiving' at the time when service is made." p. 368. 
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In a recent New Jersey decision the court defined 
''resident'' in terms of ''usual place of abode.'' The 
Court said: 
''In my opinion the word 'resident' is to be 
taken to refer to a person who has a dwelling 
house or usual place of abode-at which a sum-
mons can be served." Colon et al v. Penn. Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., et al., (N. J., 1953) 99 A. (2d) 
181, 182. 
The domicile of the defendant in the case below 
may have been elsewhere than the State of Utah. His 
"residence," however, as that term is used in the non-
resident motorist statute, was Deseret Chemical Depot, 
Tooele County, Utah. 
As was said by the Supre1ne Court of Colorado in 
Carlson v. District Court of City and County of Denve.r, 
et al., s·upra : 
''The distinction between mere residence and 
domicile must be borne in ·mind. The former is 
used in law to denote that a person dwells in a 
given place; the latter is the local home of the 
person, or that place where the law presumes that 
he has the intention of permanently residing, 
although he may be absent from it. * * * 
"The term non-resident as used in our 
statutes should be so construed as to make it con-
sistent with the purpose of the Act. It is obvi-
ous that the Legislature intended to obviate the 
difficulty presented in effecting service of process 
in the usual and ordinary way within the State 
of Colorado on non-residents, who were tempo-
rarily within the state, and who, while here, became 
involved in an auto accident on a public highway. 
I J 
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In the instant case no such difficulty presented 
itself for plaintiff was actually living and residing 
in Leadville, Colorado, with his family for a 
period of more than five rnonths after the acci-
dent, and there is nothing in the record disclosing 
any reason why service could not have been 
effectuated during this time.'' pp. 529-30. 
The Utah noB-resident motorist statute should be 
construed in the light of the objectives for which it was 
enacted. The construction placed upon the Colorado 
statute in the Carlson Case, Supra, well serves the inten-
tion of the Le~slature in enacting this method of obtain-
ing jur~sdiction in personam of non-resident motorists 
who are here today and gone tomorrow, and who accord-
ingly cannot be served hy process in the usual fashion. 
Section 41-12-8, U.C.A., 1953, should be given a 
construction consistent with the other methods of service 
of process provided by statute. In the Booth case, supra, 
the Supreme Court of Utah held that a member of the 
United States Navy stationed at the Naval Training 
Depot at San Diego, California, did not have his usual 
place of abode at his parents' home. His abode was con-
strued to be his residence for the time being. He could 
not, therefore, be served with process by leaving a copy 
of that process at his parents' home. If the plaintiff in 
that action had sought service under the provisions of the 
non-resident n1otorist statute, this court would surely have 
held that Fairbanks, having a usual place of abode in 
Californi·a, where he was then residing, was a non-resi-
dent of the State of Utah at that tin1e. Any other 
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result would have precluded the plaintiff from obtaining 
~ervice of process in any way, contrary to the purposes 
for the enactment of the non-resident motorist statute. 
The defendant in this case had a usual place of 
abode in Tooele County, Utah; that is where he was, at 
that time, residing. He was a non-resident at that time of 
the state where he had lived prior to his induction, but 
was a resident of the State of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
By this extraordinary proceedingt we have urged 
that this court cons~der and decide this question of juris-
diction because it is a question which, under modern 
travel and living conditions, will recur again and again. 
\V e perceive no real difficulty in determining a 
proper construction of the statute when the plain and 
clear meaning of the statutory words is realized. It is 
"the use and operation" of a vehicle which gives rise 
to the appointment of the Secretary of State as the 
agent for service of process. It is the "use or operation" 
which signifies the agreement that the process so served, 
shall have full legal force and effect. Obviously the 
appointment of a process agent and the signification of 
agreement occur at the time of the use or operation. 
There is no appointment, nor is there si.~ification of 
agree,ment until that time, but as soon as the use of the 
highway is made by the operation of a motor vehicle, 
the appointment and agreement spring into life. 
l i 
i ' 
I' 
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Since the use and the operation are the determining 
f'actors, the status of the person who is deemed to have 
made the appointment and to have signified his a~ree­
n1ent, must be determined conten1poraneously with such 
use and operation. There "\vas never any showing, either 
by Brandon or by inferences from the whole record, 
that Te'ague was a non-resident ~of Utah at the time 
of the accident. 
Since the statute is in derogation of common-law 
rights, and ought to be strictly construed, it is earnestly 
submitted that the defendant District Court should be 
restrained from proceeding further with the action now 
pending before it, and the temporary writ ought to be 
made permanent. 
Respectfully suh1nitted, 
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & 
SNOW andH. G. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, 
1501 Walker Bank Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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